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Gun violence is a chronic problem in the United States. Nationally in 2012, 11,622 people were killed by assault with a firearm. Many more people are injured by guns each year: in 2011, 
693,000 individuals were treated in emergency rooms 
for injuries due to assaults by firearms and similar mecha-
nisms. Gun violence takes a particularly large toll on young 
people: according to the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC), homicide accounted for 18 percent of 
deaths for males aged 15–19 and 20–24—more than for any 
other age group. For black males, homicide is the leading 
cause of death for those age groups, explaining 48 percent 
and 50 percent of deaths, respectively. The vast majority of 
these are gun-related homicides.
Thus policies to reduce lethal violence must determine 
how to prevent young men from shooting each other.  This 
has been a difficult question to answer and attracts a great 
deal of academic and policy attention. In general, violence-
prevention policies can work either by deterring violence 
or by incapacitating would-be offenders. If offenders 
have high discount rates and are unlikely to be deterred 
by future punishments, then limiting their opportunities 
to commit crime could be the most effective crime-pre-
vention policy. With this in mind, cities across the United 
States have enacted, and actively enforce, juvenile curfews.
Juvenile curfews require young people to be home 
during the nighttime hours when crime is most prevalent. 
Their goal is to reduce criminal activity via an incapacita-
tion effect, but these curfews might unintentionally reduce 
a deterrent effect that comes from having lots of people 
around. By incentivizing young people (and by extension 
their caregivers) to be at home, juvenile curfews remove 
many would-be bystanders and witnesses from public 
areas. Removing those people decreases the probability 
that any remaining offenders will get caught (because there 
are fewer witnesses who would call or assist the police), as 
well as the potential punishment (which would be higher 
if bystanders were injured). Thus, the net effect of juvenile 
curfews on public safety is unknown, and so the passage 
and enforcement of such policies continues unabated.
In our research, we test the net effect of juvenile cur-
fews on the number of gunfire incidents using exogenous 
changes in curfew hours in Washington, D.C. By law, the 
weekday curfew time changes from midnight to 11 p.m. on 
September 1st, and back to midnight on July 1st, roughly 
following the school year. (We focus here on the Septem-
ber change because the July change is difficult to isolate 
from the July 4th holiday.) If curfews reduce crime, then 
when the curfew shifts to 11 p.m. rather than midnight, 
crime between 11 p.m. and midnight should go down. To 
isolate the effect of the juvenile curfew from seasonal 
changes in gun violence, we compare the effect in the 11 
p.m. hour on weekdays to effects during two sets of control 
hours: the 11 p.m. hour on weekends (which is always be-
fore curfew), and the midnight hour (which is always after 
curfew). With a nod to the concept of a witching hour, we 
will henceforth refer to the treated hour—11:00–11:59 p.m. 
on weekdays—as the “switching hour.”
2We use the full universe of gunfire incidents detected by 
an audio sensor technology called ShotSpotter (described 
in more detail below) as our outcome measure. ShotSpot-
ter data have several advantages over counting the num-
ber of homicides in this context. First, gunfire incidents 
capture many more of the threatening uses of guns than do 
homicides, which results in more variation in the outcome 
measure and makes it easier to pick up policy effects. 
Second, ShotSpotter data are more highly correlated with 
actual gunfire than 911 calls and other reported crime data, 
thus reducing measurement error. And third, the accuracy 
of gunfire detection is unaffected by the change in curfew 
time, so using these data removes the potential confound-
ing effect of a simultaneous change in reporting.
Using ShotSpotter data, we estimate that the juvenile 
curfew in Washington, D.C., increases the number of gun-
fire incidents. On average, there are 0.015 more gunfire 
incidents during the switching hour after September 1st 
than during that hour before the curfew changed; this is 
a 50 percent increase relative to the late-curfew baseline. 
This comparison, however, does not fully isolate the ef-
fect of the curfew from seasonal changes in gun violence.  
We therefore control for changes in gun violence dur-
ing similar, non-treated hours (11 p.m. on weekends and 
midnight), which provides a cleaner estimate.  We find 
that the curfew increases gun violence by 0.045 incidents 
per hour (approximately 150 percent of the baseline). This 
aggregates to seven additional gunfire incidents per week, 
city-wide, during the switching hour alone.
We can rule out a number of alternative competing hy-
potheses. For instance, the increase in observed gun vio-
lence is not simply due to an increase in reporting, since 
our measure of gun violence does not rely on reporting. 
We can also rule out seasonal effects and the possibility 
that gun violence is simply shifted to other times. These 
results suggest that, on balance, the deterrent-reducing 
effect of juvenile curfews (due to the removal of witnesses 
and bystanders) outweighs the incapacitation effect of 
sending juveniles inside.
Using traditional crime data—such as 911 calls or 
reported crimes—for this analysis would not allow us to 
study this effect. Like some other types of crime, gun 
violence is likely underreported in a highly selected man-
ner. Particularly in inner-city communities that distrust 
the police, gunshots may not be reported unless the bullet 
hits someone and medical assistance is required (and 
even then some individuals might avoid hospitals to avoid 
arrest).  The result is that traditional data on reported 
gunfire (via 911 calls) or violent crime (via reported crime 
data) are extremely noisy and potentially unrepresentative 
measures of the timing and frequency of gunfire incidents. 
In addition, most policy interventions that aim to reduce 
gunfire probably also affect reporting rates. Any empirical 
analysis of a policy intervention’s impact on gunfire will 
therefore be biased, and often the direction of the bias 
will be unknown. 
In the past, these concerns have limited researchers to 
using homicide (which is reported with near-perfect ac-
curacy) as an outcome measure, but this approach has two 
problems.  First, homicide is a relatively rare event, and 
limited variation in the outcome makes it difficult to detect 
policy effects. Second, homicide is not the only outcome 
of interest. Ideally, we would observe all instances where a 
gun threatened someone’s safety.
If we define gun violence in this way, a very small share 
of gun-violence events result in homicides. For compari-
son, we also consider the effects of the curfew on reported 
crime and 911 calls, using geocoded data from the Met-
ropolitan Police Department. If we wanted to study the 
impacts of this policy on gun violence without ShotSpotter 
data, these are the data we would have to use. The results 
are imprecise but generally suggest that the early curfew 
decreases gun violence. This different (and we argue incor-
rect) conclusion is likely due to the simultaneous effect 
of the curfew on reporting behavior and emphasizes the 
problem with using traditional crime data for the study of 
gun violence.
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